We give an operational model of causally-ordered message-passing primitives. Based on this model, we formulate a Hoare-style proof system for causally-ordered delivery. To illustrate the use of this proof system and to demonstrate the feasibility of applying invariant-based verification techniques to algorithms that depend on causally-ordered delivery, we verify an asynchronous variant of the distributed termination detection algorithm of Dijkstra, Feijen, and van Gasteren.
Introduction
Causally-ordered delivery can be understood as a generalization of FIFO ordering [vR93] . In both, a message is delivered only after all messages on which it may depend. With FIFO ordering, this guarantee applies only to messages having the same sender; with causal ordering, this guarantee applies to messages sent by any process. Additional motivation for and examples of the use of causally-ordered delivery can be found in [Bir93] . This paper gives a proof system for causally-ordered delivery. Our proof system is similar in style to the satisfaction-based logics for synchronous message-passing in [LG81] , for ordinary asynchronous message-passing in [SS84] , and for flush channels in [CKA93] . We assume familiarity with the terminology of that literature.
Reasoning about message-passing primitives for causally-ordered delivery involves a global property, the system-wide causality relation, which defines what messages are deliverable. This distinguishes causally-ordered delivery from the types of message passing for which axiomatic semantics have already been given (e.g., [GCKW79,  LG81, SS84, CKA93]). Our work demonstrates that substantially new methods are not required when message-delivery semantics depends on global information.
A program proof in a satisfaction-based logic involves discharging three obligations:
(1) a proof outline characterizes execution of each process in isolation, (2) a "satisfaction proof" validates postconditions of receive statements, and (3) an interference-freedom proof establishes that execution of no process invalidates an assertion in another.
Our proof system for causally-ordered message-passing is similar, except step (2) is merged with step (1). (Such a merging is also possible for other satisfaction-based proof systems that handle asynchronous communication primitives, like the logics of [SS84] and [CKA93] .)
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines causally-ordered messagepassing. Our proof system is the subject of Section 3. In Section 4, we use the proof system to verify an asynchronous variant of the distributed termination detection algorithm of Dijkstra, Feijen, and van Gasteren [DFvG83] . Section 5 contains some conclusions.
A Model of Causally-ordered Message-passing
We give an operational semantics for causally-ordered message-passing primitives by translating programs containing these primitives into a generic concurrent programming language that has shared variables. The shared variables represent the state of the network.
Processes communicate by sending and receiving messages. To encode the restrictions implicit in causally-ordered delivery, each message sent is modeled in our translation by a triple d, i, t , where 1 d is the data being sent by the program, i is the name of the process 2 that sent the message, and t is a timestamp that contains information used to determine whether the message is ready for delivery.
The following functions are useful in connection with messages represented by triples. These variables have two roles: they model the current state of the network and they record the communications history. Thus, each serves both as a history variable and a special program variable-variables are special in the sense that they may be read or written only by executing send and receive statements.
data( d, i, t )
There is an obvious and seemingly simpler alternative to using variables σ i and ρ i . It is to use a single variable χ i (say), where the value of χ i is the set of messages sent to process i but not yet received (i.e., χ i equals σ i − ρ i ). The model we use has two advantages over this one-variable model. First, in our model, proving interference freedom (defined in Section 3) is easier. This is because no process can falsify m ∈ σ i or m ∈ ρ i ; predicate m ∈ χ i would be invalidated by the 1 An actual implementation of causally-ordered delivery might not require a sender name i or timestamp t. That information is used here to abstract from the details of all real implementations.
2 Processes are named 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, and hereafter identifiers i, j, k, and p range over process names. Causally-ordered delivery restricts when a message can be received. This is achieved in our translation by defining a well-founded partial order ≺ on timestamps. Our definition of ≺ is based on the theory of [Lam78] . A system execution is represented as a tuple of sequences of events;
each sequence corresponds to the execution of a single process. An event is a send event, a receive event, or an internal (i.e., non-communication) event. The happens-before (or "potential causality") relation → for a system execution is the smallest transitive binary relation on the events in that execution such that:
• If e and e are performed by the same process and e occurs before e , then e → e .
• If e is the send event for a message m and e is the receive event for that message, then e → e .
Causally-ordered delivery is formalized in terms of → as follows [BSS91] . 3 Let send (m) and receive(m) respectively denote the send event and receive event for a message m. To illustrate this definition, consider the system of three processes illustrated in Figure 1 . Process 1 sends a message m 1,3 (say, an update to a database record) to process 3 and then sends a message m 1,2 to process 2 (informing it of the update). After receiving m 1,2 , process 2 sends a 3 To be consistent with the definition in [Lam78] , clause (2) of the definition of → on page 278 of [BSS91] should be ∀m : send (m) → deliver (m). Here, deliver denotes the event referred to in our paper as receive.
Causally-ordered
4 FIFO delivery can also be formalized in terms of →. FIFO delivery ensures that if m and m are sent by the same process, to the same process, and send (m) → send (m ), then receive(m) → receive(m ). The close analogy between FIFO delivery and causally-ordered delivery should now be evident. message m 2,3 (containing an update that depends on the update in m 1,2 ) to process 3. Since send (m 1,3 ) → send (m 2,3 ), causally-ordered delivery ensures that process 3 receives m 1,3 before m 2,3 (as desired). FIFO delivery would not ensure this.
To implement Causally-ordered Delivery using timestamped messages, the timestamps and ≺ are chosen to satisfy
(1) Causally-ordered Delivery is then equivalent to requiring that a message m is received by a process p only after p has received all messages m sent to p for which ts(m) ≺ ts(m ) holds.
One way to achieve (1) is to use vector clocks [Fid88, Mat89] . Here, a vector vt i of type
of Nat is associated with process i, where vt i satisfies:
is the number of send events that are performed by process j and causally precede the next event to be performed by process i.
Partial order ≺ is defined in terms of vector clocks, as follows.
Three rules define how the vt i are updated in order to maintain the Vector Clock Property. See [Mat89] for an explanation of why these rules ensure that (1) holds.
We now give our translation of send and receive statements into statements that read and write shared variables σ i and ρ i . The following notation is used to describe the multiple-assignment [Gri76] of e 1 to x 1 , e 2 to x 2 , . . . , and e n to x n :
A send statement send e to i in process j is translated into:
where 
A receive statement receive x in process i is translated as follows, where m i is a fresh variable.
First, note that code fragments (2) and (5) First, observe that the following holds throughout execution of a program.
Initially, this holds because for all j and k, vt j [k] = 0 and σ j = ∅. Only send and receive statements change the values of these variables, so it suffices to show that our translations of these statements preserve (6), which is easily done.
Finally, we show that ¬(ts(m ) ≺ ts(m)). This is implied by (∃k :
where j is the sender of m . The latter holds because
, where the equality follows from the translation of send statements, the strict inequality follows from standard arithmetic, and the nonstrict inequality follows from (6).
Axioms for Send and Receive
We now present Hoare-style axioms [Hoa69] for the send and receive statements described above.
Given the above translation of send e to i into a multiple-assignment statement, we use the multiple-assignment axiom [Gri76] 
{P }

Thus, we have
Send Axiom: For a send statement in process j:
An inference rule for receive statements is obtained using translation (5) of receive x. Using axiom (3) for choose, the usual rules for assignment and sequential composition, and the inference rule for await statements [OG76] Await Rule:
we can show that {P } receive x {Q} is valid iff the following Predicate Logic formula is valid:
Thus, the inference rule for receive statements is
Receive Rule: For a receive statement in process i:
Causally-ordered delivery is encoded in the hypothesis of this rule. Specifically, the assumption that m i is causally minimal among unreceived messages sent to the receiving process embodies the assumption of causally-ordered delivery.
Interference Freedom
The preceding rules for send and receive, together with rules for other statements and the usual miscellaneous rules of Hoare logics (e.g., the Rule of Consequence), can be used to construct a proof outline for each process in isolation. A proof outline is a program annotated with an assertion before and after every statement. A proof outline characterizes the behavior of a process assuming that no other process invalidates assertions in that proof outline. The proof outlines for processes that execute concurrently are combined to obtain a proof outline for the entire system by showing interference freedom [OG76] -that no process invalidates assertions in the proof outline of another process.
In a proof outline P O, the assertion that precedes a statement S is called the precondition of S and is denoted pre(S), the assertion that follows a statement S is called the postcondition of S and is denoted post(S), and we write pre(P O) and post(P O) to denote the first and last assertions, respectively, in P O. We write {P } P O {Q} to denote the triple obtained by changing pre(P O) to
An assertion P appearing in a proof outline P O i is interference free with respect to proof outlines P O 1 , . . . , P O N if for all assignments, sends, and receives S in proof outlines other than
is valid. This is because (10) asserts that execution of S does not invalidate P . Assignment to variables is the only way to invalidate an assertion. 5 Since our translations for send and receive contain assignments, the interference freedom obligations require checking (10) for each send and receive statement, as well as for each assignment to an ordinary program variable.
Proof outlines P O 1 , . . . , P O N are interference free if all assertions P in the proof outlines are interference free in P O 1 , . . . , P O N . This leads to the following inference rule.
Parallel Composition Rule:
Note that, in contrast to the logics for asynchronous communication in [SS84] and [CKA93] , our parallel composition rule does not have a "satisfaction" obligation. This is not an artifact of causally-ordered message-passing; the logics of [SS84] and [CKA93] could be similarly formulated.
Example: Distributed Termination Detection
To illustrate our proof rules, we give a proof outline for the termination detection algorithm of [DFvG83] . Validity of this proof outline shows that the algorithm correctly detects quiescence in systems of processes that communicate using causally-ordered message-passing. Our proof outline is based on the correctness argument given in [DFvG83] , modified for causally-ordered delivery instead of the synchronous communication assumed there.
The algorithm is intended for use in systems where processes behave as follows. At each instant, a process is either active or quiescent, where the only action possible by a quiescent process is receipt of a message. A quiescent process may become active upon receipt of a message; an active process becomes quiescent spontaneously. Each process i has the form
where the g ij are boolean expressions, and Init i , S ij , and R i are statements that do not contain communication statements. A process i is quiescent iff each guard g ij is false. This is formalized by:
In the algorithm of [DFvG83] , a token circulates among the processes. This introduces a new kind of message, which we call a token message. To distinguish it from the messages in the original computation, hereafter called basic messages, we use a predicate istok (data(m)) that holds exactly when m is a token message. Note that a process of the form (12) cannot send basic messages to itself. 6 Define:
The system is quiescent if every process is quiescent and no messages are in transit. Thus, the system is quiescent iff the following predicate Q holds.
Code for the detection algorithm appears in Figure 2 . Angle brackets indicate that the enclosed statement is executed atomically [Lam80] . 7 Our goal is to prove that Q holds when process 0 reaches the statement in RELAY 0 preceded by the comment "quiescent". Thus, we must construct a proof outline in which the precondition of that statement implies Q. The program in Figure 2 does not take any special action when quiescence is detected-process 0 simply executes skip. A round of communication could easily be added to notify each process that quiescence has been detected.
We now describe in detail how the algorithm works, presenting side-by-side informal explanations and corresponding formal assertions.
A color, either black or white, is associated with each process. For each process i, we introduce a boolean variable b i such that b i is true iff process i is black. The detection algorithm sets b i to true when process i sends a basic message; its sets b i to false when i sends a token message.
Therefore, we can assert that b i holds if process i has a sent a basic message since it last sent a token message. This is formalized as an assertion in terms of the following state function: 8
6 This restriction is not needed for correctness of the algorithm; we adopt it here because it simplifies the correctness proof slightly.
7 Angle brackets are not necessary for correctness. We use them because they eliminate the need for control predicates (or auxiliary variables) in the proof. Introducing control predicates requires additional proof rules and a more general definition of interference freedom. This would lengthen the correctness proof, so for simplicity of exposition, we use angle brackets.
8 The name lx i is a mnemonic for "last transmission" of the token by process i. The assertion about b i is now formalized as:
Code for Process i
The algorithm proceeds as a sequence of rounds. One process serves as the initiator for all rounds; it starts each round by sending a token message. Without loss of generality, assume process 0 is the initiator. In each round, the token is received by every process exactly once, ending with the initiator. We define the token to be at position i if it has been sent to process i and not subsequently sent by process i; we say that the token visits a process when the token has been received by but not sent from that process. For each process i, we introduce a new variable h i that is true iff the token is visiting process i.
In each round, the token visits the processes in descending order by process name. Thus, the token visits process N − 1, N − 2, . . ., 0, and the current token position is given by the state function:
Note that all arithmetic on process names is modulo N .
An assertion J tok says that the token circulates among the processes in a certain fixed order.
J tok states that the N most recent sends of token messages are totally ordered by causality. This is equivalent to stipulating that timestamps on these token messages form an ascending sequence.
Note that the truth of J tok does not depend on the use of causally-ordered message-passing.
An assertion relating the timestamps of token messages to the timestamps of basic messages is also needed. For this, we use an assertion J bas , whose informal interpretation is as follows. The use of causally-ordered message-passing is essential for ensuring that J bas holds throughout execution of the algorithm. The validity of J bas also depends on other properties of the algorithm.
For example, it depends on J tok , as one can see from the proof of T9 in the Appendix. Informally, to conclude that the system is quiescent, we must show (among other things) that all basic messages have been delivered. J bas enables us to do this by providing an upper bound on when basic messages must be delivered. The bound is expressed in terms of the timestamps of token messages.
We formalize the assertion using an additional state function. 
Assertions J 1 , J bas , and J tok contain all of the information about message-delivery order needed for correct operation of the algorithm. We encapsulate this information as a single assertion J:
As with processes, a color, either black or white, is associated with the token. The color of the token is represented as before-black is encoded as true, and white is encoded as false. While in transit, this boolean value is included in each token message; while the token is visiting a process i, a new variable t i is used to store the color of the last token message received by process i.
Given a boolean value c, mktok (c) denotes a token value whose color is c. The color of the token is extracted using a selector tokval . Thus, istok (mktok (c)) = true and tokval (mktok (c)) = c hold. In each round, the token is initially white. It becomes black (if it isn't already) when it visits a process i (i.e. h i equals true) that is black (i.e. b i equals true). Thus, the token becomes black when it visits a process that has sent a basic message since last sending a token message, and the current token color is given by:
We also associate with each process i a variable y i , which is used for temporary storage of received values.
When the token returns to the initiator, if either the initiator or the token is black, then the initiator starts another round. If both are white, then the system is quiescent (i.e., Q holds).
Informally, when a white token returns to the initiator, we conclude that at the time of the token's last visit to each process, that process had not sent a basic message since the token's previous visit to that process. From this and J bas , we know that all basic messages sent to each process were delivered before the token's final visit to that process, hence no process was re-activated after the token's final visit. Thus, all processes are quiescent and all channels are empty-the system must be quiescent. This is reflected in the proof outlines of Figure 3 by the Q in the precondition for the second branch of the alternation statement RELAY 0 .
The operation of the algorithm is succinctly characterized by K, where
K 1 says that every process visited by the token in the current round is quiescent and no basic message sent by one of these processes is in transit. Moreover, if the token is visiting process tp, then no basic messages sent by process tp are in transit to processes the token has visited in this round. Informally, K 1 implies that every process visited by the token in the current round is quiescent and will remain quiescent unless one of them receives a message from a process not yet visited by the token in the current round. K 2 says that some process not already visited by the token during the current round is black. Informally, if some such process is black, then it might have sent a message that will re-activate a process already visited by the token during the current round. Finally, K 3 says that the token is black. Informally, the token is black if it visited a process that recently sent messages; these messages could re-activate other processes, so the system might not be quiescent.
Assertions J and K are not quite strong enough to prove correctness of the algorithm. An assertion I that expresses several simple properties of the algorithm (e.g., that there is always at most one token message in the system) is also needed. Thus, we define I
∧(|σ
and total (S) ∆
= (∀m, m ∈ S : m = m ⇒ ts(m) ≺ ts(m ) ∨ ts(m ) ≺ ts(m)).
Conjuncts (14) and (15) together say that at most one token message is in transit. Conjunct Proof outlines for processes augmented to detect termination appear in Figure 3 . The Appendix contains a detailed justification of the proof outlines.
Communication statements may appear in guards, so we use the following proof rule for iteration statements:
Iteration Rule:
Here, g i is a boolean expression and C i is a receive or skip statement. 9 One might expect there to be an assertion between g i and C i in the rule's conclusion. Expression g i contains program variables of only process i, so g i cannot be invalidated by execution of another process. In particular, interference cannot occur even if evaluation of g i and execution of C i are not performed as a single indivisible action. Thus, there is no need to make the assertion explicit.
To illustrate reasoning about receive statements, we give a detailed proof for the triple
This triple arises as a hypothesis in the application of the Iteration Rule to the main loop of each process. The triple expresses a crucial fact about the algorithm-that activation of a process (i.e., the changing of q i to false) by reception of a basic message does not falsify K. By Receive Rule 9 The guard "g; skip" is abbreviated "g"; the guard "true; receive x" is abbreviated "receive x". 
Proof Outline for Process
where the substitution θ is:
We show in the Appendix that I ⇒ I[θ] is valid. Here, we first show that
is valid. We assume the antecedent and prove the consequent. Note that
Thus, if K 2 or K 3 holds, then so does (29). Suppose neither K 2 nor K 3 holds. Since I holds by assumption, K must also hold, so K 1 must hold as well. We now show that in this case, 
holds whenever the antecedent of (28) holds. This is equivalent to showing 
Comparison to Related Work
This distributed termination detection algorithm was first presented in [DFvG83] for systems that use synchronous communication. Apt [Apt86] formalized the partial-correctness argument of [DFvG83] and proved some additional properties of the algorithm. Verjus then attempted to
give another proof of partial-correctness [Ver87] , but his argument was flawed [vGT90] . This suggests that showing correctness of this algorithm is non-trivial, even if synchronous communication is being assumed.
The first correctness argument applicable to this algorithm in an asynchronous setting is (to the best of our knowledge) an operational argument due to Raynal and Helary [RH90] . Proposition 3.8.1 in [RH90] establishes partial correctness assuming that the message-delivery order satisfies a property P . Our proof assumes causally-ordered delivery, which implies our predicate J bas ; J bas is similar to but slightly stronger than property P of [RH90] .
Another operational (albeit more formal) proof, by Charron-Bost et al., appears in [CBMT92] .
It shows correctness of this termination detection algorithm for systems that communicate using causally-ordered message-passing. The proofs there differ considerably from the invariant-based analysis of the synchronous case in [DFvG83] . In fact, Charron-Bost et al. claim that correctness proofs for all algorithms that use causally-ordered delivery "must consider the execution as a whole, rather than concentrate on assertions that remain invariant in each global state" ([CBMT92], p.
34). The existence of our proof, which is an invariant-based analysis, refutes this claim.
Conclusions
We have presented a Hoare-style proof system for causally-ordered delivery. Through an example,
we have demonstrated the feasibility of our approach to reasoning about causally-ordered delivery. The example, a distributed termination detection algorithm, has been treated using other approaches, so there is now an opportunity to compare those approaches with the one in this paper.
The fact that a correctness proof for causally-ordered delivery can be based closely on the analysis of a synchronous version is a significant benefit of the approach discussed in this paper.
We support a two-step approach to verifying algorithms that use asynchronous message-passing
1. Verify a synchronous version of the algorithm (presumably a simpler task).
2. Modify the algorithm and the proof to obtain a correctness proof for the asynchronous version of the algorithm.
One benefit of this two-step approach is that it leads naturally to a focus on and accurate determination of the ordering requirements needed by the algorithm. An interesting question is the extent to which this approach can be made formal and systematic.
A Proof of Correctness
We show that the proof outlines in Figure 3 are valid. We discuss only the triples for non-composite statements. It is easy to prove validity of the proof outlines in Figure 3 using these results and the inference rules for sequential composition, iteration, and alternation. The triples for non-composite statements that arise in the proofs for each process in isolation are listed in Figure 4 . Proving invariance of I is straightforward, so we omit those details. For brevity, we sometimes are content with an informal explanation for why a triple is valid; based on this, the reader should have little difficulty constructing a formal proof.
For 0 < i < N: 
A.1 Proof for Process i > 0 in Isolation
J is unaffected by execution of Init i because Init i neither sends nor receives messages. To see that K is also unaffected, note that the only variables that appear in K and can be assigned by Init i are those appearing in q i , and that K is independent of q i for i ≤ tp. The proof that K is preserved is by case analysis on the disjunct of K that holds initially.
The precondition of T1 implies
case K 1 : In this case, tp ≥ i must also hold, since i > tp and K 1 imply q i , contradicting g ij in the precondition of T3. Since i ≤ tp and b i hold, K 2 also holds, so see that case.
case K 2 : K 2 is unaffected by execution of this statement, so K 2 still holds after execution of this statement.
case K 3 : K 3 is unaffected by execution of this statement, so K 3 still holds after execution of this statement.
T4 : {I ∧ g ij } S ij {I}
J is unaffected by execution of S ij because S ij neither sends nor receives messages. The only variables that appear in K and can be assigned by S ij are those appearing in q i . Since g ij holds, q i is false, so execution of S ij either truthifies q i or leaves it unchanged. Variable q i occurs only positively in K, so truthifying q i never falsifies K.
Adding elements to ρ i never falsifies J or K, and J and K do not depend on y i or vt i , so J and K are preserved by execution of this statement. We argued in Section 4 that the other conjuncts in the postcondition hold after execution of this statement.
J is unaffected by execution of this statement because messages are neither sent nor received.
The proof that K is preserved is by case analysis on the disjunct of K that holds initially. Note 
Next we show that J bas is preserved. Fix j, k, and m ∈ χ j,k (we have renamed the bound variable i in (13) to j). We do a case analysis on the relative values of j, k, and tp. Finally, we show that K is preserved by execution of this statement. Recall that execution of this statement changes tp from i to i−1. Note that execution of this statement leaves tc unchanged.
The proof that K is preserved is by case analysis on the disjunct of K that holds initially. 
A.2 Proof for Process 0 in Isolation
The verification of process i when i = 0 in isolation involves the following triples, in addition to those discussed above. Finally, we discuss one proof obligation that arises when using the foregoing results to verify the proof outlines given in Figure 3 . When proving the second branch of RELAY 0 , the following subgoal arises:
We assume the antecedent and prove the consequent. First, we show that K 1 must hold, by showing that K 2 and K 3 do not. Since h 0 holds, we conclude (using I) that tp = 0. From tp = 0 and ¬b 0 , we conclude that K 2 does not hold. From h 0 and ¬(t 0 ∨ b 0 ), we conclude that K 3 does not hold.
Thus, assuming the antecedent holds, K 1 also holds. It is easy to show that K 1 and the antecedent together imply Q.
A.3 Interference Freedom
Most of the interference freedom obligations can be discharged easily, using derived rules such as 
